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Introduction 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a kind of security regime which was established at 
President Bush’s suggestion in May 2003. Its purpose is to intercept vehicles, ships, and 
airplanes in order to protect against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
Seventeen countries including the United States have currently joined in the PSI, and over sixty 
countries in the world support this initiative. PSI activities have been mainly focused on the 
interception of ships, which has had a practical effect since 2003. The reason is that the 
proliferation of WMD is generally accomplished by transportation using ships. However, these 
activities have posed some problems:  
• The innocent passage or freedom of navigation in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) might be undermined.  
• China and Russia as major powers are not active participants in these activities.  
• The object of interception is willfully categorized as aiming at certain rogue states.[1]  
• Identification and interdiction are usually difficult as long as the shipping materials are 
dual-use items which are generally comprised of WMD-related materials.  
Although these problems are not easily resolved, the PSI has helped to settle them thanks to the 
expanding trend toward international consensus on the non-proliferation of WMD. In particular, 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1540, which was agreed upon in April 2004, 
requests member states to take effective domestic, border, export, and transportation controls 
focused on WMD-related materials. Although that resolution did not provisionally address 
interdiction through checks and inspections, it is recognized to have legitimacy in terms of 
international law since it is interpreted as a pro-active activity to implement the resolution.[2]  
The PSI, led by the United States, usually aims at “rogue states” of proliferation concern, 
especially North Korea (the DPRK), since it has continuously threatened the peace and security 
of Northeast Asia through its nuclear development program for over a decade, and it is also 
notorious for illegal trade involving missiles as well as chemical and biological weapons-related 
materials. Related to the North Korean nuclear issue, United States Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice has emphasized that “the PSI is based on existing international or national 
law” and “there is needed no more actions and certain types of resolution” with addressing the 
usefulness of the PSI.[3] It should be interpreted as a warning that in the case of failure of the 
Six-Party Talks, the PSI would be implemented immediately in order to deter the proliferation of 
WMD.  
Fortunately, the pressure applied to North Korea of using the PSI has slightly diminished since 
the joint statement by the Six-Party Talks related to the renunciation of North Korea’s nuclear 
program was adopted on September 19, 2005. However, the core of the PSI has not completely 
disappeared. If North Korea does not act in concert with a thorough and concrete action plan 
related to the dismantlement of its nuclear program which will be discussed at the Six-Party Talks 
in the future, the pressure placed on North Korea by the PSI would emerge again immediately. 
Even if the North Korean nuclear issues are finally resolved at the Six-Party Talks, it is clear that 
the PSI would continuously put pressure on North Korea as long as it continues illegal trade of 
missiles, and chemical and biological weapons related-materials.  
With the above issues in mind, this article examines the potential influence on North Korea when 
the United States finally does implement the PSI due to North Korea’s defiance against the 
United States' non-proliferation policy and assesses South Korea’s desirable options toward 
North Korea within the context of PSI pressures.  
Influence of the PSI on North Korea 
Economic Influence 
Damage caused by blockage of foreign currency 
Insufficiency of foreign currency in North Korea is one of its three major economic difficulties, 
along with food and energy difficulties. Thus tackling this problem has become an important task 
of North Korea’s policy. The size of North Korea’s foreign trade, including $1 billion between the 
two Koreas, is only about $4 billion. Moreover, North Korea records a trade deficit equivalent to 
about $0.7 billion every year.  
North Korea is trying to solve the trade deficit through various activities. Those activities include 1) 
arms exports such as missiles, artillery etc.; 2) illegal transfer of drugs and counterfeit notes; 3) 
earnings by Mt. Keum-Kang tours and economic cooperation and support from South Korea 
(ROK); and 4) remittances by Koreans abroad, especially in Japan.  
According to North Korea experts, North Korea seems to earn about $0.4-0.5 billion per year 
through its export of weapons such as missiles.[4] Estimates of North Korea’s earnings from the 
illegal transfer of drugs and counterfeit notes vary largely according to various sources.[5] 
Integrating these estimates, we can say that North Korea earns about $300-500 million with drugs 
and counterfeit notes every year. North Korea records $150 million profits from trade with the 
ROK, and earns $15 million through Mt. Keum-Kang tours every year. Thus North Korea acquires 
about $170 million every year through exchanges between the two Koreas. Besides, North Korea 
gets about $30-100 million every year through remittances from Korean-Japanese who support 
North Korea.[6] Summing up these figures, we can estimate that the total size of North Korea’s 
foreign currency acquisition is about $900-1,100 million every year. Accordingly, if the PSI is 
implemented, in terms of pressure upon North Korea, North Korea will not be able to earn the 
foreign currency equivalent to about $700-1,000 million per year. This means the Kim Jong Il 
regime will have difficulties in terms of both its economic and political power.  
Aggravation of economic difficulties 
If the PSI is implemented by the resolution of the UN Security Council to enforce economic 
sanctions due to North Korea’s defiance on the nuclear issue, it is clear that the North Korean 
economy will meet a terrible blow. Of course, it is uncertain whether China will participate in such 
sanctions, but the ROK will inevitably join. This means that all economic cooperation and support 
including trade between the two Koreas will be stopped.  
In this case, it will be impossible for North Korea to gain about $170 million from trade and Mt. 
Keum-Kang tours and about $170 million in terms of humanitarian aid such as food and fertilizer 
every year from the ROK. Besides, various cooperation activities, such as the Kaesung Industrial 
Complex and agricultural cooperation conducted at both government and civilian levels, will be 
halted. Moreover, humanitarian aid by the World Food Program (WFP), which covers half of 
North Korea’s food shortage, will also be stopped. As a result, North Korea will face severe 
economic difficulties. Particularly if China joins the sanctions, then it is quite possible that North 
Korea might face the risk of regime collapse. 
Political Influence  
Stick to the hard-line policy toward the United States 
Missiles, drugs, and counterfeit notes are means of solving the foreign currency difficulty faced by 
North Korea. Especially missiles, which play a role as political and economic negotiation chips 
toward the West, including the United States.  
If the United States militarily implements sea and air blockades and enforces the freezing of 
economic assets to prevent the proliferation of WMD, North Korea will feel plenty of pressure, 
both politically and psychologically. North Korea will blame fiercely, and resist strongly, the 
activities of the PSI led by the United States. In particular, North Korea will instigate people to 
resist the United States through large-scale demonstrations domestically, and continue to issue 
statements against its critics internationally. In fact, North Korea had postponed the next round of 
Six-Party Talks indefinitely, recognizing that the drive toward implementation of the PSI, and the 
establishment of a United States human rights act aimed at North Korea, are kinds of “death 
policies from pressure toward the North,”[7] and has protested against them strongly. North Korea 
probably thinks these hard-line policies against the United States will play a role not only to deter 
the PSI, but also to utilize the normalization negotiations between the DPRK and the United 
States in the future.  
Hindrance of participation in the PSI and build-up of public opinion for international 
criticism  
If the United States thoroughly implements the PSI toward North Korea, the North Korean 
economy will be ruined and its regime might collapse. Therefore, North Korea will try to draw 
international attention to the Korean Peninsula with threats of nuclear testing and local 
provocation of the ROK in order to avoid such a situation.  
Meanwhile, the implementation of the PSI by the United States as an economic sanction might 
not succeed unless the ROK and China, which account for half of North Korea’s trade, participate 
in the PSI. North Korea knows this fact well. So North Korea will probably press the ROK not to 
join the PSI with threats that this would create military tension. North Korea might threaten the 
ROK by nullifying the joint statement agreed upon at the fourth Six-Party Talks under the pretext 
of the ROK’s cooperation with the PSI. North Korea will also ask China not to join the economic 
sanctions, taking advantage of the United States-China relationship reversely and, indeed, it will 
likely be hard for China to reject North Korea’s request. North Korea will also place blame fiercely 
on the United States’ hegemonic intervention in domestic affairs, and create public opinion for 
international criticism toward the United States. Especially to emphasize international criticism, 
North Korea will try to let China and Russia lead the international criticism against the United 
States in concert with the Third World, including the Middle East countries which are antagonistic 
toward the United States.  
Heightening of military tension 
North Korea repeatedly announced in its keynote speech at the fifth Economic Cooperation 
Committee between the two Koreas, the statement of the Homeland Peace Unification 
Committee (May 25, 2003), and in the Rodong Shinmun (June 2, 2003), that if the United States 
implements the PSI and additional international action follows to prevent North Korean nuclear 
proliferation, then there will be a terrible retaliation by North Korea. North Korea also emphasized 
through the statement by the Panmunjeom Representative of the Korean People’s Army (July 1, 
2003) that if the United States imposes sanctions on North Korea, and sea and air blockades, 
then North Korea will recognize that action as a breach of the armistice agreement, and take a 
strong retaliatory action.[8]  
Meanwhile, Baek Hak Soon, DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs, clarified in a letter to the chairman 
of the UN Security Council that the PSI violates Clause 13 of Article 2 (prohibition of arms import) 
and Clause 15 of Article 2 (prohibition of blockade) and therefore North Korea regards the 
international economic sanctions through sea and air blockades as an act of war. So, when 
interception operations at sea are conducted, and participants of the PSI, headed by the United 
States, blockade North Korea’s waters, North Korea seems to be warning it will not avoid war in 
terms of self defense, while entering into the highest combat readiness posture. Practically, North 
Korea will probably heighten military tension on the Korean Peninsula, including the mobilization 
of all its armed forces, and provocative actions such as violation of the Northern Limit Line (NLL).  
Cohesion and dissolution of North Korea’s military authorities[9]  
If PSI interception exercises at sea are conducted near the Korean Peninsula, and the checks 
and inspections against North Korea’s vessels are conducted, then North Korea’s military 
authorities would feel a crisis. As a result, the cohesion of North Korea’s military authorities would 
be intensified temporarily. Especially when a large-scale joint exercise by member states of the 
PSI is conducted in the vicinity of North Korea’s waters, the North Korean military would 
strengthen its combat readiness amid the rampant of slogans of ‘anti-America’, ‘anti-imperialism’, 
and ‘defend the motherland’. North Korea would also strengthen its military-diplomatic efforts in 
order to get some support from China. The more the PSI pressure level increases, the more the 
cohesion of North Korean military authorities will heighten due to the feeling of a survival crisis.  
Meanwhile, although the pressure of the PSI against North Korea will become more 
comprehensive, and if China does not argue or make claims about the ongoing PSI activities or 
Russia’s participation in the activities, then North Korean military authorities would be disunited 
with feelings of frustration and defeat. This might be caused by dissatisfaction about the failure of 
government policy resulting in the DPRK's international isolation and survival crisis. If this 
situation continues for long, North Korean military authorities would be divided into two camps: 
hardliners who are in favor of the present policy of fighting, and moderates who are in favor of 
avoidance of isolation.  
Withering of the defense industry 
In North Korea, materials used for development and production of military goods including WMD-
related materials are generally imported from Japan. However, since Japan has participated 
actively in the PSI, it has become more difficult for North Korea to import these defense-related 
materials from Japan.  
In fact, some of North Korea’s cargo vessels which shipped missiles, drugs, and chemicals had 
been intercepted prior to the practical implementation of the PSI. For example, in December 2002 
the North Korean cargo vessel Sosan, carrying Scud missiles, was intercepted by a Spanish 
naval ship in the Arabian Sea. The North Korean vessel Bongsoo, loaded with heroin, was seized 
by the Australian Navy in April 2003. And, in August 2003 a North Korean cargo vessel shipping 
chemicals was held in custody in the port of Gaoshung by the Taiwanese government.[10] When 
the PSI aimed at North Korea is fully implemented, all North Korean vessels in question would be 
more comprehensively intercepted everywhere. Consequently, North Korea's defense-related 
materials would be impossible to trade, and in the aftermath of limited imports and exports, the 
North Korean defense industry will naturally wither.  
Strengthening of acquisition means for strategic materials 
The United States has intensively controlled the export of strategic materials and technologies 
headed for countries which present dangers to the security of the United States. Examples are 
the Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for the 
export control of dual-use items; the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) for the export control of weapons and defense materials; the Trading 
with the Enemy Act (TEA) for the economic blockade toward enemy countries; the Atomic Energy 
Act (AEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) for the export control as to the nuclear 
related materials; the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the export control of high-
performance computers, missiles, and satellite-related materials; and the Enhanced Proliferation 
Control Initiative (EPCI), etc.[11]  
The Bush Administration has been trying to deter the influx of militarily convertible materials and 
technologies heading to rogue states such as North Korea, strengthening the implementation of 
such domestic laws. This means it is more difficult for North Korea to get materials and 
technologies related to the development and production of WMD. As a result, North Korea will try 
to enhance its R&D capability independently. In addition, North Korea might misuse the Kaesung 
Industry Complex Project in order to get strategic materials and technologies. Namely, it will try to 
obtain strategic materials and technologies covertly through South Korea’s companies located in 
the Kaesung Industry Complex, camouflaging them with civilian use.  
Conclusion: The ROK’s Option 
When the PSI is thoroughly implemented by the United States against North Korea, the ROK 
cannot help approaching it with great caution, since it has to consider the bilateral relations—i.e., 
the ROK-United States alliance, and South-North Korean cooperative relations. In short, if the 
PSI is implemented only for the nonproliferation of WMD, the ROK should support the PSI itself, 
but limit its participation in the PSI activity, considering simultaneously its inter-Korean bilateral 
relations. However, if the PSI is implemented as an economic sanction by resolution of the UN 
Security Council, the ROK would better participate in all activities except provocative actions such 
as onboard inspections by the ROK Navy.  
Several options for the ROK to take are as follows:  
With respect to the United States, the ROK should persuade the United States that its 
participation in the PSI would be indirect and limited. Firstly, it is necessary for the ROK to let the 
United States know that the ROK fully supports the purpose and method of the PSI. However, it is 
also necessary for the ROK to persuade the United States that if the ROK participates in the PSI 
directly, it will probably irritate North Korea and thus would not be helpful to improve the two 
Koreas’ relations. Owing to such characteristics of the PSI, it is difficult for the ROK to join the PSI 
directly. Accordingly, the ROK should let the United States know that its participation would be 
indirect instead of direct.  
There are various indirect and limited participations in the PSI for the ROK. Above all, the ROK 
can declare its support for the PSI internationally having in mind the symbolic characteristics of 
the PSI as vehicle of political pressure. Moreover, the ROK can join the PSI as an observer 
instead of directly joining the interception activities through military means. Besides, the ROK also 
can participate in the exchange of information related to the doubtful North Korean behavior of 
WMD proliferation, and the adoption of a resolution related to WMD against North Korea.  
Secondly, it is necessary for the ROK to encourage the United States to restrain its interception 
activities in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula. Generally, interception exercises at sea using 
information exchanges and check/inspections mobilize the naval ships from every country. 
Consequently, it makes littoral countries tense up. If such an exercise is implemented near the 
Korean Peninsula, especially next to North Korea’s waters, it will be irritating the North Koreans, 
who object to the PSI. As a result, North Korea will probably respond against South Korea locally 
in terms of revenge. Therefore, it is necessary for the ROK to ask the United States not to 
conduct the interception exercises near the Korean Peninsula.  
With respect to North Korea, the ROK should persuade North Korea to make a big deal with the 
United States related to its nuclear issue. The non-proliferation of WMD and WMD-related 
materials after September 11 is developing into a consensus within the international community. 
Every UN member country is obliged to implement the concrete non-proliferation actions 
according to the Resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council. For example, every UN member 
country is required to prohibit all kinds of support of non-state actors pursuing the development, 
production, acquisition, and use of WMD, and establish a related law and implement it.[12]  
Accordingly, the ROK should let North Korea know about this international reality and persuade it 
to solve the nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks. In those processes, the ROK should 
emphasize considerable counter-presentations such as economic compensation and regime 
assurance from the ROK and western countries in exchange for dismantling its nuclear program.  
The ROK should also persuade North Korea to become a member state of the international non-
proliferation regime. Nowadays, international non-proliferation regimes such as international 
treaties and multilateral export control mechanisms aiming at the proliferation of WMD are 
enforcing their control mechanisms more tightly, especially in the wake of September 11. For 
example, guidelines for small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the man-portable air defense 
system (MANPADS) might influence both Koreas’ future policies.  
North Korea at present is in a state of withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), where it's been since the second nuclear 
crisis caused by its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program occurred in August 2002. Although 
North Korea may come back to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, its bio-chemical weapons 
and missiles are still matters of concern because it is not a member state of those WMD-related 
international regimes. So, in order to escape fundamentally from PSI-targeting led by the United 
States, the ROK should persuade North Korea to become a member state of all the international 
non-proliferation regimes, and comply with those obligations. 
About the Author 
Dr. Kim Myung Jin is Director of the Center for Security and Strategy, Arms Control Division and 
Research Fellow at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). Educated at Kyung Hee 
University with a Ph.D. in Business Administration, Dr. Kim's research interests include Inspection 
and Verification, and Confidence Building Measures in the Korean Peninsula. He was a Visiting 
Researcher this past year at the Naval Postgraduate School's research program on Korean 
unification and security studies, where he conducted a research project on South Korean security 
for a book to be published in Korea. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email ccc@nps.edu 
with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be used for no other 
purpose. 
References 
1. According to the Statement of Interdiction Principles agreed in the Paris Conference in 
September 2003, the objects of interdiction are “states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern. ” However, rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are the objects of interdiction 
actually. Pakistan, Israel, and India should be included in the objects of interdiction in terms of 
proliferation concern, however, the United States excluded them. In that sense, the PSI is being 
criticized.  
2. "State Department Outlines Proliferation Security Initiative," GlobalSecurity.org, December 29, 
2004.  
3. The Dong-A Ilbo, April 29, 2005. 
4. Michael Horowitz, Larry Wortzel, and Larry Niksch estimate that it was $560 million in 2001, 
$600 million in 2002 and $400-500 million every year respectively. See Taewoo Kim et al., North 
Korea ’s Response to the PSI and ROK ’s Countermeasures (Korea Institute for Defense 
Analyses, 2005, 10), 39. 
5. The Congressional Research Service (CRS), Wall Street Journal, and United States Forces in 
Korea Command estimate $71 million with drugs and $15 million with counterfeit notes in 1997, 
$500-1,000 million with drugs and $15 million with counterfeit notes in 2001, and $500 million with 
drugs and $15-20 million with counterfeit notes every year respectively. 
6. Nicholas Eberstadt at the American Enterprise Institute estimates that it was $100 million per 
year in the early 1980s and the 1990s. The Congressional Research Service estimates $30 
million per year from after 1990s to the latest decade.  
7. The Chosun Ilbo, December 10, 2004; The Segye Ilbo, July 6, 2005. 
8. The Hangyoreh, July 1, 2003.  
9. Taewoo Kim, et al., Op. Cit., 47-48. 
10. Kyudok Hong, “Proliferation Security Initiative and Our Policy Option,” Arms Control on the 
Korean Peninsula 34 (ROK Ministry of National Defense, December 2003), 102-104; Choonkeun 
Lee, “Proliferation Security Initiative and the North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
Center for Free Enterprise, July 21, 2004. 
11. Myung Jin Kim et al., Export Control of Strategic Material toward North Korea (Korean 
Institute for Defense Analyses, 2001), 58-59. 
12. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) Clause 8. 
CCC Home Naval Postgraduate School 
 
